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ABSTRACT

This unit is one of a series that represents specific moments in history from which students focus on the meanings of landmark events. The events of 1945 are regarded widely as a turning point in 20th century history, a point when the United States unequivocally took its place as a world power, at a time when Americans had a strong but war-oriented economy and a long standing suspicion of Europeans in general. Based on primary sources, this unit explores the decisions of key policymakers at this crucial moment in modern history. The unit contains three lessons dealing with U.S. foreign policy from 1945 to 1950 including the outbreak of the Korean War. The first lesson plan is on the atomic bomb and its effect on international relations. In this lesson students analyze three U.S. arguments on possible use of the atomic bomb and define and discuss the idea of "atomic diplomacy" on post-World War II relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the second lesson plan the policy of containment is defined and arguments are presented both for and against its adoption by the United States. The third lesson deals with the practice of containment. In it students analyze how the policy was put into practice by the United States; identify and define actions that exemplify the containment policy; define and analyze the Soviet perspective on the American policy of containment; and use the Korean conflict as an example of the containment policy in action. (Author/DK)

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ED 376 102

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

A UNIT OF STUDY FOR GRADES 9 - 12

by Lisa King
Teacher Associate, NCHS

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On the cover: The fireball of Priscilla, the fifth shot, Summer 1957 series, risen from Frenchman Flat. Courtesy of The Bettmann Archive.

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Finally, we acknowledge the continuing contributions of the National Endowment for the Humanities which established the National Center for History in the Schools in March 1988 and has generously supported this activity.

For information on additional teaching units and other resources from the Center, please write:

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APPROACH AND RATIONALE

By Linda Symcox

The National Center for History in the Schools has developed the following collection of lessons for teaching **The Cold War**. Our units are the fruit of a year-long collaboration between history professors and experienced teachers of both United States and World History. They represent specific "**dramatic moments**" in history from which you and your students can pause to delve into the deeper meanings of selected landmark events and explore their wider context in the great historical narrative.

In our approach, the continuing narrative provides the context in which the dramatic moment is situated. By studying a crucial turning-point in history, the student becomes aware that choices had to be made by real human beings, that those decisions were the result of specific factors, and that they set in motion a series of historical consequences. We have selected dramatic moments that best bring alive that decision-making process. We hope that through this approach, your students will realize that history is an ongoing, open-ended process, and that the decisions they make today create the conditions of tomorrow's history.

Our dramatic moments are based on **primary sources**, taken from documents, artifacts, journals, diaries, newspapers and literature from the period under study. As you know, a primary source is a **first-hand** account of any event in history. For example, the telecast or the script of a speech would be a primary source. A secondary source is a **second-hand** account of an event. This would be, for example, the newspaper account of the speech the next day or a newscaster's report about the speech. All historical accounts, such as textbooks, are by their very nature secondary sources. What we hope to achieve

using primary source documents in these lessons is to remove the distance that students feel from historical events and to connect them more intimately with the past. In this way we hope to re-create for your students a sense of "being there," a sense of seeing history through the eyes of the very people who were making decisions. This will help your students develop historical empathy, and to realize that history is not an impersonal process divorced from real people like themselves. At the same time, by analyzing primary sources, students will actually practice the historian's craft, discovering for themselves how to analyze evidence, establish a valid interpretation and construct a coherent narrative in which all the relevant factors play a part.

CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION

Within this unit, you will find: 1) **Teacher Background Materials** and 2) **Lesson Plans** with **Student Resources**. This unit, as we have said above, focuses on certain key moments in time and should be used as a supplement to your customary course materials. We have chosen to pitch the various lessons on different grade levels and they can usually be adapted to a slightly higher or lower level.

The **Teacher Background** section should provide you with a good overview of the entire unit and with the historical information and context necessary to link the specific **Dramatic Moment** to the larger historical narrative. You may consult it for your own use, and you may choose to share it with students if they are of a sufficient grade level to understand the materials.

The **Lesson Plans** include step-by-step instructions for the teacher. Feel free to elaborate or cut steps as you see the need. These lesson plans contain student resources

which accompany each lesson. These resources consist of primary source documents, any handouts or student background materials, and possibly a bibliography for the unit.

In our series of teaching units, each collection can be taught in several ways. You can teach all of the lessons offered on any given topic, or you can select and adapt the ones that best support your particular course needs. We have not attempted to be comprehensive or prescriptive in our offerings, but rather to give you an array of enticing possibilities for in-depth study, at varying grade levels. We hope that you will find the lesson plans exciting and stimulating for your classes. We also hope that your students will never again see history as a boring sweep of inevitable facts and meaningless dates but rather as an endless treasure of real life stories, and an exercise in analysis and reconstruction, rather than rote memorization.

TRUMAN "GIVES THEM AN EARFUL" AT POTSDAM

On April 12, 1945, Vice President Truman was called to the White House and was escorted to the second floor study of Eleanor Roosevelt. Grief-stricken faces greeted him as Mrs. Roosevelt placed her hand on Truman's shoulder and announced that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had died. "Is there anything I can do for you?" asked a shocked Truman. Mrs. Roosevelt shook her head and replied, "Is there anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now."

Trouble indeed, for Vice President Truman had never been included in high level foreign policy discussions. In fact, between the fourth term inauguration and the President's death, Truman met only three times with Franklin Roosevelt.

About three months after assuming office, more assertive but still unsure of himself, Truman boarded a ship for Europe. He was headed for Potsdam, near Berlin, to meet his allies, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Josef Stalin. "I sure dread this trip, worse than anything I've had to face," Truman wrote to his wife Bess. Despite his apprehensions, Truman quickly took charge of the Potsdam Conference. He boasted that "The boys say I gave them an earful" and later told Bess that "I reared up on my hind legs and told 'em where to get off and they got off."

Truman meant that during the Conference he was informed that the United States had successfully exploded an atomic bomb, which could be used against Japan to end World War II and as a diplomatic weapon to persuade others to reconcile themselves to American policies.

A DRAMATIC MOMENT

Even before the end of World War II, an American president was leading the country into a Cold War with its ally the Soviet Union.



"Little Boy," atom bomb. Courtesy of UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

I. UNIT OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE

On August 6, 1945, two days before the Russians had promised their American allies that they would enter the war against Japan, the Americans dropped one atomic bomb on Hiroshima that destroyed the city and half of its population. Two days later the Russians declared war on Japan, as they had agreed in 1944, before the Americans knew they would have an atomic bomb. On August 9, the United States dropped a second bomb on Nagasaki. The resulting Japanese capitulation on August 15 made the Russian invasion unnecessary. Ever since, the Russians have assumed that the Americans chose their timing deliberately. The Russians could not blame the Americans for wishing to keep the Russians out of Japan and reconstruct that country according to their own ideas. The Russians believed, however, that the bombs were also meant to intimidate the Russians, who had, like the Germans, experimented with atomic energy without perfecting any application of it. When the Americans offered a plan for sharing nuclear capability among the great powers after the war, the Russians rejected what they regarded as unfair or suspicious conditions. Thus, the bomb that ended one war marked the beginning of another: the Cold War.

The events of 1945 are widely regarded as a turning-point in twentieth-century history, a point when the United States unequivocally took its place as a world power, at a time when Americans had a strong but war-oriented economy and a long-standing suspicion of Europeans in general. This unit explores the decisions of key policy-makers at this crucial moment in modern history.

II. UNIT CONTEXT

These lessons deal with American foreign policy from 1945 to 1950 including the outbreak of the Korean War. The material should be introduced after covering World War II. This unit would also fit in nicely with a thematic approach to United States foreign policy. After studying the ideological differences between Americans and Russians and the use of "atomic diplomacy," students should have some basic background for the study of the Korean War and later events.

III. UNIT OBJECTIVES

1. To analyze the cultural, historical, economic and political factors that propelled the United States and the Soviet Union into the Cold War

2. To examine "atomic diplomacy" in the early Cold War years and to determine the extent to which acquisition of atomic weaponry caused or affected the Cold War.

IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

During World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics joined to fight a common enemy, the allied belligerent fascist countries. The anti-fascist alliance was strained throughout the war because the United States and Great Britain delayed attacking the Germans in Europe for several years while Russians carried the brunt of the fighting in Eastern Europe. Matters of postwar policy were not discussed thoroughly by leaders of the three powers, although Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin made an informal agreement--to which President Roosevelt implicitly agreed--that Russians would have a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and the Americans and British would control other key areas. For example, the United States was especially determined to reconstruct Japan to make sure that the power of the feudal, militaristic ruling class was dismantled and replaced by a system that would favor both Japanese and American interests.

American victory in Japan represented no direct threat to the Russians but other actions by Americans did, even before the bomb. In San Francisco in April, 1946, the opening sessions of the new United Nations were marked by the strenuous efforts of American representatives to form an anti-Soviet bloc. In May, Truman and his cabinet resolved on a policy of abruptly ending the lend-lease program to Russia, condemning the Russians for taking over the Eastern European countries and for removing German factories to Russia to replace some of those destroyed in the war. In all of this, American leaders believed they were fighting an ideological war between the forces of capitalism and communism, and they did not distinguish this struggle from the basically nationalist policies of the sole policy-maker in Russia, the dictator Josef Stalin.

Given the evident enthusiasm of Americans for a war of ideology, Stalin enthusiastically declared one openly early in 1946, by asserting in a major speech that the contradictions of capitalism would tear the capitalist countries apart and communism would become the reigning system in the world. This pronouncement blithely ignored the fact that Russia's system was neither communism nor capitalism but a totalitarian dictatorship employing awkward imitations of socialist ideology and institutions. He also ignored the fact that his backward country, only 28 years removed from its revolution against feudalism, had an almost impossible task of catching up economically with the powerful capitalist countries.

The major response by Americans to Stalin's posture was to "contain" what they regarded as a worldwide conspiracy to spread communism. This repeatedly led to miscalculation of Russian intentions and power. In 1947, Greece was convulsed by civil war, and the Americans believed that Russia was trying to take over the country. President Truman announced his "Truman Doctrine" that the United States was pledged to preventing such takeovers, and the first of several similar interventions was launched there at a cost of several hundred million dollars. The Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe was also conceived as primarily an "anti-communist" measure. The Russians soon developed their own atomic bombs, and the arms race was on and would continue for nearly half a century.

V. LESSON PLANS

1. The Atomic Bomb and the Effect on International Relations

2. The Policy of Containment

3. The Practice of Containment

LESSON ONE

THE ATOMIC BOMB AND ITS EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Objectives

1. To analyze the three U.S. arguments on possible use of the atomic bomb.

2. To define and discuss the idea of "atomic diplomacy" on post-World War II relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

B. Lesson Activities

1. Assign students to pair up and prepare for **LESSON THREE** (set a due date), by interviewing three people who remember the 1940's to find out what they remember most about the beginning of the Cold War.

2. Assign in advance the reading of the following documents: **DOCUMENT A**, "The Interim Committee on Military Use of the Atomic Bomb, 1945;" **DOCUMENT B**, The Franck Committee on a Noncombative Atomic Demonstration, 1956;" and **DOCUMENT C**, "Henry L. Stimson's Appeal for Atomic Talks with Russia, 1945".

   Have students sum up the major arguments of each document in one paragraph or less.

3. Divide the class into six groups and assign each group one of the documents (**A,B**, or **C**) so that there are two separate groups for each document to be analyzed. Have students share their arguments from the previous night's homework pertaining to their assigned document and make a composite list of common points. They should then collaborate

and come up with a paragraph summing up the arguments of their document.

4. Assign one student to act as a class recorder and list the major arguments on the board for each document as a spokesperson from each group reads the collective paragraph.

5. After the above is completed ask if there are any additions to the lists. This may be done on an individual rather than group basis since all students should have come prepared to discuss each document.

6. Enter into a class discussion considering the following points:

   a. Which alternative did the United States government pursue?

   b. Evaluate the impact of this decision on superpower relations in the immediate post-war years. What might have been the outcome if other options had been chosen?

   c. Define "atomic diplomacy." What was the effect of this policy during this time?

7. Assign **DOCUMENTS D**, Kennan's "Long Telegram;" **DOCUMENT E**, Churchill's "Iron Curtain Speech;" and **DOCUMENT F**, Wallace's "Questioning the Get Tough Policy," for homework.

C. Evaluating the Lesson

1. Check for understanding during discussion or assign a writing assignment based on the three documents. Assuming they have a background in some foreign

policy, students could be asked to write an essay according to the following directions:

a. Modeling your writing on the documents discussed, create your own "document" as if you were an analyst for the State Department, or...

b. Advise the President on the use of the atomic bomb. Consider, foremost, the idea of "atomic diplomacy."

LESSON TWO

THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

A. Objective (Two Days)

1. To define the policy of containment and present the arguments both for and against its adoption by the United States.

B. Lesson Activities

1. Assign three students to prepare a dramatic reading from each of the three documents. The following selections are suggested:

   a. **DOCUMENT D** - paragraph #4

   b. **DOCUMENT E** - paragraphs #5-8

   c. **DOCUMENT F** - paragraphs #1-7 and #15-19

2. After listening to the readings, have each student complete a quickwrite on which argument she/he most agrees with and why. Note: two of the arguments advocate the policy of containment and only one is against it. Students will be persuaded by numerous factors. Have them include a detailed description as to why they support their indicated view.

3. Now consider each document carefully. Have students refer to their homework and the quickwrite and describe the major arguments for each article. Make a composite list for each document on the board. When the composite lists are complete, students should be better able to argue and support their views.

4. Have students divide into three groups to analyze **DOCUMENTS D, E, or F.** Have each group develop an argument supported by documentary evidence. Choose a spokesperson from each group and have them read the collaborative statements to the class.

5. After each group has presented its argument, the two other groups should formulate a rebuttal to it. Each group should present its rebuttal to the class. At the end, the teacher can open the subject up for class discussion. Some points to consider would be:

   a. How precisely can we define the policy of containment?

   b. Why did the United States decide to pursue this policy?

   c. What were the international ramifications of this policy?

   d. Analyze the rhetoric of the "Iron Curtain" speech. What effect did Churchill's personality have on the adoption of this policy?

   e. What arguments does Wallace present in opposition to the policy of containment?

C. Evaluating the Lesson

1. Teachers will have many opportunities for evaluations throughout this lesson. Homework, quickwrites and composite lists can be collected in order to monitor student progress. In addition, teachers can monitor student contributions during discussion.

2. If formal assessment is desired, the teacher should assign the following writing assignment:

   a. In a short essay, compare and contrast the three documents regarding the policy of containment. Which position would you support and why? What alternatives were possible at this point?

LESSON THREE

THE PRACTICE OF CONTAINMENT

A. Objectives (Three Days)

1. To analyze how the policy of containment was put into practice by the United States.

2. To identify and define actions that exemplify the containment policy (Marshall Plan, and Truman Doctrine).

3. To define and analyze the Russian perspective on the American policy of containment.

4. To use the Korean conflict as an example of the containment policy in action.

B. Lesson Activities

1. Assign students to pair up and interview at least three people who were young adults during the post-war years to find out their perceptions of this time. **Remember**: memories often reflect what the individual would like to remember rather than what actually took place. The objective of this activity is for the students to find out how ordinary people reacted to the Soviet Union and international affairs of this period. The students should have this interview recorded or summarized in the written report by the beginning of the third day of the lesson. Students should take care to report on what informants do **not** remember and evaluate the significance of that.

   A variety of questions could be asked, such as,

   a. Do you remember either the Truman Doctrine or

the Marshall Plan? If so, what do you remember and what did you think of these policies at the time?

b. What was your opinion of the Soviet Union during World War II and in the post-war years?

c. Did you approve of the bombing of Japan with atomic weapons? What do you think today?

d. What did you think of the involvement of the United States in Korea? What was that war about?

2. Ask students to read **DOCUMENT G**, Andrei Vishinsky's speech at the U.N. attacking U.S. policy. In either a written assignment or in small discussion groups have the students define the strengths and weaknesses of the argument?

3. Assign the primary documents (or the textbook selection) dealing with the following policies:

   a. The Truman Doctrine (**DOCUMENT H**)

   b. The Marshall Plan (**DOCUMENT I**)

   c. The Korean War

4. Ask the following questions either in class discussion, small groups or individual writing assignments:

   a. How does government action reflect U.S. policy? (Compare and contrast **DOCUMENTS D** and **E** with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.)

   b. What were the effects of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan?

c. Analyze the United States' decision to go into Korea. Defend or refute this decision.

5. Distribute an outline map of the world. Have students locate areas of concern for the containment policy, such as Greece, Turkey, China, and Southeast Asia. Where and how has the United States tried to implement the containment policy?

6. Have students share the results of their interviews. What was the relationship between foreign policy and domestic reaction? Was the doctrine of containment a realistic one? What commonalities and differences did the interviews produce? How are relations between communist and non-communist countries different today? How has the new threat of complete nuclear annihilation affected the world?

C. Evaluating the Lesson

1. A unit test can be given which assesses the major points developed throughout the unit. A suggested essay topic is:

What factors best explain the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1945? What actions on either side might have averted the Cold War?

STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT A

THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MILITARY USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, 1945

(Primary Source)

Secretary Stimson explained that the Interim Committee had been appointed by him, with the approval of the President, to make recommendations on temporary war-time controls, public announcement, legislation and post-war organization...He expressed the hope that the [four] scientists would feel completely free to express their views on any phase of the subject....

General Marshall discussed at some length the story of charges and countercharges that have been typical of our relations with the Russians, pointing out that most of these allegations have proven unfounded. The seemingly uncooperative attitude of Russia in military matters stemmed from the necessity of maintaining security. He said that he had accepted this reason for their attitude in his dealings with the Russians and had acted accordingly. As to the post-war situation and in matters other than purely military, he felt that he was in no position to express a view. With regard to this field he was inclined to favor the building up of a combination among like-minded powers, thereby forcing Russia to fall in line by the very force of this coalition. General Marshall was certain that we need have no fear that the Russians, if they had knowledge of our project, would disclose this information to the Japanese. He raised the question whether it might be desirable to invite two prominent Russian scientists to witness the test.

Mr. Byrnes expressed a fear that if information were given to the Russians, even in general terms, Stalin would ask to be brought into the partnership. He felt this to be particularly likely in view of our commitments and pledges of cooperation with the British. In this connection Dr. Bush pointed out that even the British do not have any of our blue prints on plants. Mr. Byrnes expressed the view, which was generally agreed to by all present, that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research to make certain that we stay ahead and at the same time make every effort to better our political relations with Russia.

It was pointed out that one atomic bomb on an arsenal would not be much different from the effect caused by any Air Corps strike of present dimension.

STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT A

However, Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the visual effect of an atomic bombing would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.

After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the Secretary expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses.

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STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT B

THE FRANCK COMMITTEE ON A NONCOMBAT ATOMIC DEMONSTRATION, 1945
(Primary Source)

The way in which the nuclear weapons, now secretly developed in this country, will first be revealed to the world appears of great, perhaps fateful importance.

One possible way—which may particularly appeal to those who consider the nuclear bombs primarily as a secret weapon developed to help win the present war—is to use it without warning on an appropriately selected object in Japan. It is doubtful whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan to resist, especially given the fact that the major cities like Tokyo Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe already will largely be reduced to ashes by the slower process of ordinary aerial bombing. Certain and perhaps important tactical results undoubtedly can be achieved, but we nevertheless think that the question of the use of the very first available atomic bombs in the Japanese war should be weighed very carefully, not only by military authority, but by the highest political leadership of this country. If we consider international agreement on total prevention of nuclear warfare as the paramount objective, and believe that it can be achieved, this kind of introduction of atomic weapons to the world may easily destroy all our chances of success. Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries, will be deeply shocked. It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement. We have large accumulations of poison gas, but do not use them, and recent polls have shown that public opinion in this country would disapprove of such a use even if it would accelerate the winning of the Far Eastern war. It is true, that some irrational element in mass psychology makes gas poisoning more revolting than blasting by explosives, even though gas warfare is in no way more "inhuman" than the war of bombs and bullets. Nevertheless, it is not at all certain that the American public opinion, if it could be enlightened as to the effect of atomic explosives, would support the first introduction by our own country of such an indiscriminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian life.

STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT B

Thus, from the "optimistic" point of view—looking forward to an international agreement on prevention of nuclear warfare—the military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world, and perhaps dividing even the public opinion at home.

From this point of view a demonstration of the new weapon may best be made before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be achieved if America would be able to say to the world, "You see what weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to renounce its use in the future and to join other nations in working out adequate supervision of the use of this nuclear weapon."

This may sound fantastic, but then in nuclear weapons we have something entirely new in the order of magnitude of destructive power, and if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage which its possession gives us, we must use new and imaginative methods. After such a demonstration the weapon could be used against Japan if a sanction of the United Nations (and of the public opinion at home) could be obtained, perhaps after a preliminary ultimatum to Japan to surrender or at least to evacuate a certain region as an alternative to the total destruction of this target.

It must be stressed that if one takes a pessimistic point of view and discounts the possibilities of an effective international control of nuclear weapons, then the advisability of an early use of nuclear bombs against Japan becomes even more doubtful—quite independently of any humanitarian considerations. If no international agreement is concluded immediately after the first demonstration, this will mean a flying start of an unlimited armaments race. If this race is inevitable, we have all reason to delay its beginning as long as possible in order to increase our headstart still further....The benefit to the nation, and saving of American lives in the future, achieved by renouncing an early demonstration of nuclear bombs and letting the other nations come into the race only reluctantly, on the basis of guesswork and without definite knowledge that the "thing does work,"

may far outweigh the advantages to be gained by the immediate use of the first and comparatively inefficient bombs in the war against Japan. At the least, pros and cons of this use must be carefully weighed by the supreme political and military leadership of the country, and the decision should not be left to considerations, merely, of military tactics.

One may point out that scientists themselves have initiated the development of this "secret weapon" and it is therefore strange that they should be reluctant to try it out on the enemy as soon as it is available. The answer to this question was given above—the compelling reason for creating this weapon with such speed was our fear that Germany had the technical skill necessary to develop such a weapon without any moral restraints regarding its use.

Another argument which could be quoted in favor of using atomic bombs as soon as they are available is that so much taxpayers' money has been invested in those projects that the Congress and the American public will require a return for their money. The above-mentioned attitude of the American public opinion in the question of the use of poison gas against Japan shows that one can expect it to understand that a weapon can sometimes be made ready only for use in extreme emergency; and as soon as the potentialities of nuclear weapons will be revealed to the American people, one can be certain that it will support all attempts to make the use of such weapons impossible.

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STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT C

HENRY L. STIMSON'S APPEAL FOR ATOMIC TALKS WITH RUSSIA, 1945
(Primary Source)

The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe.

In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial offset of the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Soviet Government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the development of this weapon....Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.

If we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace council objectives.

Whether Russia get control of the necessary secrets of production in a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and co-operative partners among the peace-loving nations of the world. It is true if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into production of bombs a little sooner than they would otherwise.

To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they

became immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For is we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in an all-out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can—one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever. The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.

If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution to prescribe the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control—his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress.

Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of express or implied threats or near threats in our peace negotiations.

My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as in instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and

encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the U.K. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes. I would make such an approach just as soon as our immediate political considerations make it appropriate.

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States—backed by Great Britain but peculiarly the proposal of the United States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose debates which would surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would provoke but scant favor from the Soviets. As I say, I think this is the most important point in the program.

After the nations which have won this war have agreed to it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the covenants and finally to incorporate the agreement into the scheme of the United Nations. The use of this bomb has been accepted by the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas I am most skeptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history of the world.

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GEORGE F. KENNAN'S "LONG TELEGRAM," 1946
(Primary Source)

Introduction

While George F. Kennan was an attaché in the Moscow Embassy, he sent the following famous and influential "long telegram" to Washington. Because this foreign policy document was written as a telegram, articles (a, an, and the) were omitted to save money, as telegram charges were determined by the number of words written.

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they had learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted.

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In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about the outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning

sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth—indeed, their disbelief in its existence—leads them to view all stated facts as instruments of furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers—extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisers whom they never see and cannot influence—this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here....

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent "modus vivendi", that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of

major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve—and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

1. Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

2. Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

3. Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and—for the moment—highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

4. All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

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For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

1. Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

2. We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

3. Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand

diplomatic notes and joint communiques. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit—Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

4. We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put foreword in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

5. Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

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WINSTON S. CHURCHILL'S "IRON CURTAIN" SPEECH, 1946
(Primary Source)

The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. With primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. As you look around you, you feel not only the sense of duty done but also feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement. Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the after-time. It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision shall guide and rule the conduct of the English-speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We must and I believe we shall prove ourselves equal to this severe requirement....

Before we cast away the solid assurances of national armaments for self-preservation, we must be certain that our temple is built, not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but upon the rock. Anyone with his eyes open can see that our path will be difficult and also long, but if we persevere together as we did in the two World Wars—though not, alas, in the interval between them—I cannot doubt that we shall achieve our common purpose in the end.

I have, however, a definite and practical proposal to make for action. Courts and magistrates cannot function without sheriffs and constables. The United Nations Organization must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force....

It would nevertheless be wrong and imprudent to entrust the secret knowledge or experience of the atomic bomb, which the United States, Great Britain, and Canada now share, to the world organization, while it is still in its infancy. It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world. No one in any country has slept less well in their beds because this knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it are at present largely retained in American hands. I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and some Communist or neo-Fascist state monopolized, for the time being, these dread agencies. The fear of them alone might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free

democratic world, with consequences appalling to human imagination....

A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is sympathy and good will in Britain—and I doubt not here also—toward the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships.

We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers from all renewal of German aggression. We welcome her to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent, and growing contacts between Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty, however, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American, and French observation.

The Russian-dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to preeminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy....

However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and

throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, where communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. These are somber facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy, and we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains.

The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in Manchuria. The agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when the Japanese war was expected to last for a further eighteen months from the end of the German war. In this country you are all so well informed about the Far East and such devoted friends of China that I do not need to expatiate on the situation there....

Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them; they will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be relieved by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

Last time I saw it all coming, and cried aloud to my own fellow countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and

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we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind.

There never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be powerful, prosperous, and honored today, but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool.

We surely must not let that happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the world instrument, supported by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections.

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STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT F

HENRY A. WALLACE QUESTIONS THE "GET TOUGH" POLICY, 1946

(Primary Source)

How do American actions since V-J Day appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like $13 billion for the War and Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29s and planned production of B-36s, and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table. These facts rather make it appear either 1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or 2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had ten thousand-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coast lines and we did not?

Some of the military men and self-styled "realists" are saying: "What's wrong with trying to build up predominance of force? The only way to preserve peace is for this country to be so well armed that no one will dare attack us. We know that America will never start a war.

The flaw in this policy is simply that it will not work. In a world of atomic bombs and other revolutionary new weapons, such as radioactive poison gases and biological warfare, a peace maintained by a predominance of force is no longer possible.

Why is this so? The reasons are clear:

First. Atomic warfare is cheap and easy compared with old-fashioned war. Within a very few years several countries can have atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. Compared with the cost of large armies and the manufacture of old-fashioned weapons, atomic bombs cost very little and require only a relatively small part of a nation's production plant and labor force.

Second. So far as winning a war is concerned, having more bombs—even many

more bombs—than the other fellow is no longer a decisive advantage. If another nation had enough bombs to eliminate all of our principal cities and our heavy industry, it wouldn't help us very much if we had ten times as many bombs as we needed to do the same to them.

Third. The most important, the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in a neurotic, fear-ridden, itching-trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world, and because of our wealth and vulnerability we would be among the most seriously affected. Atomic war will not require vast and time-consuming preparations, the mobilization of large armies, the conversion of a large proportion of a country's industrial plants to the manufacture of weapons. In a world armed with atomic weapons, some incident will lead to the use of those weapons.

There is a school of military thinking which recognizes these facts, recognizes that when several nations have atomic bombs, a war which will destroy modern civilization will result and that no nation or combination of nations can win such a war. This school of thought therefore advocates a "preventative war," an attack on Russia now, before Russia has atomic bombs. This scheme is not only immoral but stupid. If we should attempt to destroy all the principal Russian cities and her heavy industry, we might well succeed. But the immediate countermeasure which such an attack would call forth is the prompt occupation of all continental Europe by the Red Army. Would we be prepared to destroy the cities of all Europe in trying to finish what we had started? This idea is so contrary to all the basic instincts and principles of the American people that any such action would be possible only under a dictatorship at home.

Thus the "predominance of force" idea and the notion of a "defensive attack" are both unworkable. The only solution is the one which you have so wisely advanced and which forms the basis of the Moscow statement on atomic energy. That solution consists of mutual trust and confidence among nations, atomic disarmament and an effective system of enforcing that disarmament.

There is, however, a fatal defect in the Moscow statement, in the Acheson report, and in the American plan recently presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. That defect is the scheme, as it is generally understood, of arriving at international agreements by "easy stages," of requiring other nations

to enter into binding commitments not to conduct research into the military uses of atomic energy and to disclose their uranium and thorium resources while the United States retains the right to withhold its technical knowledge of atomic energy until the international control and inspection system is working to our satisfaction. In other words, we are telling the Russians that if they are "good boys" we may eventually turn over our knowledge of atomic energy to them and to the other nations. But there is no objective standard of what will qualify them as being "good" nor any specified time for sharing our knowledge.

Is it any wonder that the Russians did not show any great enthusiasm for our plan? Would we have been enthusiastic if the Russians had a monopoly of atomic energy, and offered to share the information with us at some indefinite time in the future at their discretion if we agreed now not to try to make a bomb and give them information on our secret resources of uranium and thorium? I think we should react as the Russians appear to have done. We would have put up counterproposal for the record, but our real effort would go into trying to make a bomb so that our bargaining position would be equalized....

Insistence on our part that the game must be played our way will only lead to a deadlock. The Russians will redouble their efforts to manufacture bombs, and they may also decide to expand their "security zone" in a serious way. Up to now, despite all our outcries against it, their efforts to develop a security zone in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East are small change from the point of view of military power as compared with our air bases in Greenland, Okinawa and many other places thousands of miles from our shores. We may feel very self-righteous if we refuse to budge on our plan and the Russians refuse to accept it, but that means only one thing—the atomic armament race is on in deadly earnest.

I am convinced therefore that if we are to achieve our hopes of negotiating a treaty which will result in effective international atomic disarmament we must abandon the impractical form of the "step-by-step" idea which was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. We must be prepared to reach an agreement which will commit us to disclosing information and destroying our bombs at a specific time or on terms of specified actions by other countries, rather than at our unfettered discretion. If we are willing to negotiate on this basis, I believe the Russians will also negotiate seriously with a view to reaching an

agreement....

Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent months by the playing up of conflict in the press, stems from differences in political and economic organizations....

...Today, under the pressure of seemingly insoluble international problems and continuing deadlocks, the tide of American public opinion is again turning against Russia. In this reaction lies one of the dangers to which this letter is addressed.

I should list the factors which make for Russian distrust of the United States and of the Western world as follows: The first is Russian history, which we must take into account because it is the setting in which Russians see all actions and policies of the rest of the world. Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest—by the Mongols, the Turks, the Swedes, the Germans and the Poles. The scant thirty years of the existence of the Soviet government has in Russian eyes been a continuation of their historical struggle for national existence. The first four years of the new regime, from 1917 through 1921, were spent in resisting attempts at destruction by the Japanese, British and French, with some American assistance, and by the several White Russian armies encouraged and financed by the Western powers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet state was almost conquered by the Germans after a period during which the Western European powers had apparently acquiesced in the rearming of Germany in the belief that the Nazis would seek to expand eastward rather than westward. The Russians, therefore, obviously see themselves as fighting for their existence in a hostile world.

Second, it follows that to the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the Western powers seem to have an aggressive intent. Our actions to expand our military security system—such steps as extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations, our present monopoly of the atomic bomb, our interest in outlying bases and our general support of the British Empire—appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense. I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history. From the

Russian point of view, also, the granting of a loan to Britain and the lack of tangible results on their request to borrow for rehabilitation purposes may be regarded as another evidence of strengthening of an anti-Soviet bloc.

Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm water ports and her own security system in the form of "friendly" neighboring states seems, from he Russian point of view, to clinch the case. After twenty-five years of isolation and after having achieved the status of a major power, Russia believes that she is entitled to recognition of her new status. Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by and large has never existed, seems to her an attempt to res-establish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her.

It is of the greatest importance that we should discuss with the Russians in a friendly way their long-range economic problems and the future of our cooperation in matters of trade. The reconstruction program of the USSR and the plans for the full development of the Soviet Union offers tremendous opportunities for American goods and American technicians.

American products, especially machines of all kinds, are well established in the Soviet Union. For example, American equipment, practices and methods are standard in coal mining, iron and steel, oil and nonferrous metals.
Nor would this trade be one-sided. Although the Soviet Union has been an excellent credit risk in the past, eventually the goods and services exported from this country must be paid for by the Russians by exports to us and to other countries. Russian products which are definitely needed or which are noncompetitive in this country are various nonferrous metal ores, furs, linen products, lumber products, vegetable drugs, paper and pulp and native handicrafts....

Many of the problems relating to the countries bordering on Russia could more readily be solved once an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence is established and some form of economic arrangements is worked out with Russia. These problems also might be helped by discussions of an economic nature. Russian economic penetration of the Danube area, for example, might be countered by concrete proposals for economic collaboration in the development of the resources of this area, rather than by insisting that the Russians should cease

their unilateral penetration and offering no solution to the present economic chaos there.

This proposal admittedly calls for a shift in some of our thinking about international matters. It is imperative that we make this shift. We have little time to lose. Our postwar actions have not yet been adjusted to the lessons to be gained from experience of Allied cooperation during the war and facts of the atomic age.

It is certainly desirable that, as far as possible, we achieve unity on the home front with respect to our international relations; but unity on the basis of building up conflict abroad would prove to be not only unsolid but disastrous. I think there is some reason to fear that in our earnest efforts to achieve bipartisan unity in this country we may have given away too much to isolationism masquerading as tough realism in international affairs.

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STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT G

VISHINSKY'S ATTACK ON U.S. POLICY
(Primary Source)

On September 18, 1947, Andrei Vishinsky, chairman of the Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly, lashed out at American policy.

A number of newspapers and magazines, mostly American, cry every day and in every way about a new war, systematically promoting this baneful psychological coaxing of public opinion of their countries. The warmongers indulge in propaganda under a smokescreen of cries about strengthening of national defense and the necessity to fight against a war danger which allegedly comes from other countries.

The war-mongering propagandists try by hook and crook to frighten people poorly versed in politics by the fables and vicious fabrications about alleged preparations on the part of the Soviet Union to attack America. They certainly know only too well that they are telling lies, that the Soviet Union is not threatening in any way an attack on any country, that the Soviet Union devotes all its forces to the cause of rehabilitation of the areas that either were destroyed by the war or suffered general damage in the course of war, that the Soviet Union devotes all its efforts to the cause of rehabilitation and further development of its national economy....

As one can judge by a number of signs, the preparation for a new war has already passed the stage of a sheer propaganda, psychological coaxing and war of nerves. Numerous facts prove that in some countries—and this particularly the case of the United States—the war psychosis is being warmed up by putting into effect practical measures of military and strategical characters together with such organizational and technical measures as the construction of new military bases, relocation of armed forces in accordance with plans of future military operations, expansion of manufacture of new armaments and feverish work for the purpose of improving weapons....

It should be noted that the capitalist monopolies, having secured a decisive influence during the war, retained this influence on the termination of the war, skillfully utilizing for this purpose governmental subsidies and grants of billion of dollars as well as the protection they enjoyed and still are enjoying from the

various governmental agencies and organizations. This is facilitated by the close connections of the monopolies with Senators, members of the government, many of whom very often are either officials or partners in the monopolistic corporations.

Such as state of affairs affects also industrial scientific activity concentrated in the laboratories of various large corporations.

The same can be said with regard to the research in the field of the use of atomic energy. Such capitalistic monopolies like Du Pont chemical trust, Monsanto Chemical Company, Westinghouse Company, General Electric, Standard Oil and others are most closely connected with this research work, being complete masters in this field.

Before the war they maintained the closest cartel connections with German trusts, and many cartel agreements contained a clause on the renewal of the exchange of information after the war.

...It is by no means accidental that the particularly violent warmongers among them are those who are closely connected with commercial, industrial and financial trusts, concerns and monopolies.

There is no need to name too many of them. It is sufficient to mention some them, having in view certainly, not their personalities, personal convictions, personal merits and so on—but mainly those social groups, enterprises, industrial, technical, scientific societies whose views and interest these person represent.

1. *Dorn, member of the House of Representatives on May 7...*
2. *Jordan, the president of the National Industrial Conference...*
3. *Earle, former United States Minister in Hungary and Bulgaria...*
4. *Eaton, chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs...*
5. *McMahon, Senator, former Chairman of Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy...*
6. *Grooks, Senator, from Illinois...*
7. *General Deane [former head of U.S. Military Mission in the U.S.S.R.]...*

9. *John Foster Dulles, in a speech delivered on Feb. 10, 1947, in Chicago, urged "a tough foreign policy toward the Soviet Union," declaring that if the U.S.A. does not take up such a course counting on possibility of reaching a compromise with the Soviet Union, then the war is inevitable. In the same speech Dulles boasted that since the collapse of the Roman Empire no nation ever possessed such great superiority of material power as the United States, and urged the United States to utilize this power to promote its ideals...*

The meaning of these statements is clear. They are poorly camouflaged instigation for war against the U.S.S.R. This is a provocative attempt to divert attention from the true war-mongers to camouflage their war-mongering activity with a slanderous demagogy about a "social revolution in the whole world" and other rot, expecting the simpletons easily to believe it.

Excerpts reprinted from The New York Times, September 19, 1947.

STUDENT HANDOUT: DOCUMENT H

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, 1947
(Primary Source)

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.

The foreign policy and the national security of the country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation....

The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to

help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United

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States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

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Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for the purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1/10 of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

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STUDENT RESOURCE: DOCUMENT I

THE MARSHALL PLAN
(ECONOMIC COOPERATION ACT OF 1948)
(Primary Source)

Recognizing the intimate economic and other relationships between the United States and the nations of Europe, and recognizing that disruption following in the wake of war is not contained by national frontiers, the Congress finds that the existing situation in Europe endangers the establishment of a lasting peace, the general welfare and national interest of the United States, and the attainment of the objectives of the United Nations. The restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, stable international economic relationships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance. The accomplishment of these objectives calls for a plan of European recovery, open to all such nations which cooperate in such plan, based upon a strong production effort, the expansion of foreign trade, the creation and maintenance of internal financial stability, and development of economic cooperation, including all possible steps to establish and maintain equitable rates of exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers. Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage these countries through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts as set forth in the report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation signed at Paris on September 22, 1947, which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity. It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence in Europe through assistance to those countries of Europe which participate in a joint recovery program based upon self-help and mutual cooperation: Provided, That no assistance to the participating countries herein contemplated shall seriously impair the economic stability of the United States. It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that continuity of assistance provided by the United States should, at all times, be dependent upon continuity of cooperation among countries participating in the program.

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